The leader of the Salem Chapter of the Hells Angels Motorcycle Club pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court to criminal charges in connection with the assault and maiming of a former member of the Red Devils Motorcycle Club.
Sean Barr, 50, of Lynn, pleaded guilty before U.S. District Judge Nathaniel M. Gorton to conspiring to commit violent crimes in aid of racketeering, maiming in aid of racketeering, assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering, and assault resulting serious bodily injury in aid of racketeering. On Feb. 5, 2015, three co-defendants, Marc Eliason, 37, of Lynn; Robert DeFronzo, 47, of Saugus; and Brian Weymouth, 42, of Danvers, pleaded guilty to similar charges. Eliason and DeFronzo were members of the Salem Hells Angels and Weymouth was a member of the Red Devils. The Red Devils Motorcycle Club is a support club of the Hells Angels.
Barr, Eliason, DeFronzo and Weymouth were involved in luring the victim, who was targeted for failing to follow orders issued by the Salem Hells Angels, and assaulting the victim. The victim was targeted because he failed to assault a former member of the Salem Hells Angels, who had been “put out bad” from the Hells Angels. At the Byfield clubhouse, the victim was surrounded by the defendants and beaten. During the assault, Barr used a ballpeen hammer, a favored weapon of the Hells Angels, to maim the victim by breaking a number of bones in the victim’s hand. Eliason and Weymouth then stole the victim’s motorcycle.
The charging statutes provide a sentence of no greater than three years in prison, one year of supervised release, and a $250,000 fine on the charge of conspiring to commit violent crimes in aid of racketeering; 30 years in prison, five years of supervised release, and a $250,000 fine on the charge of maiming in aid of racketeering; 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $250,000 fine on the charge of assault with a dangerous weapon in aid of racketeering; and 20 years in prison, three years of supervised release, and a $250,000 fine on the charge of assault resulting in serious bodily injury in aid of racketeering. Pursuant to their respective plea agreements with the government, and pending acceptance by the district court at sentencing, Barr and Eliason have each agreed to sentences of 97 months in prison, and DeFronzo and Weymouth have each agreed to sentences of 57 months in prison.
Friday, February 20, 2015
Two Street Gang Leaders Plead Guilty to Drug Trafficking and Firearm Charges #OperationConcord
Alexis Hidalgo and Jonathan DaSilva, the respective leaders of two Boston street gangs—the Hendry Street Gang and the Woodward Avenue Gang—pleaded guilty to drug trafficking and firearm charges.
Hidalgo, 34, and DaSilva, 31, both of Boston, each pleaded guilty before U.S. District Court Judge Rya W. Zobel to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, cocaine, marijuana, and oxycodone, as well as firearm related charges. In January 2013, Hidalgo and DaSilva were two of 29 defendants charged with drug trafficking and firearm charges arising out of Operation Concord, a joint investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Police Department, Massachusetts State Police, and Homeland Security Investigations that focused on gang violence and drug dealing in the Henry Street and Woodward Avenue areas of Boston. During the course of Operation Concord, law enforcement officials seized approximately $400,000 in cash, guns, jewelry, gold and silver bars, and several luxury vehicles.
From August 2011 through January 2013, Hidalgo and DaSilva, the respective heads of the Hendry Street and Woodward Avenue gangs, ran a lucrative drug trafficking business distributing crack cocaine, cocaine, marijuana, and oxycodone which was in turn distributed in Boston, Brockton, and Maine.
Hidalgo and DaSilva operated their drug business out of two primary locations: a house at 37 Hendry Street in Boston and a house known as “the Trap” at 36 Woodward Avenue in Boston. Customers seeking crack and marijuana would go to 37 Hendry Street to purchase drugs from gang members who stored the drugs and cooked cocaine into crack in the second floor apartment. In August 2012, 37 Hendry Street was shut down by the City of Boston as a result of numerous neighborhood complaints of drug and gang activity.
“The Trap” at 36 Woodward Avenue, which was run by DaSilva, operated as a round-the-clock distribution center for crack, oxycodone, cocaine and marijuana. When 37 Hendry Street was shut down, Hidalgo transferred his crack business to 36 Woodward Avenue.
Hidalgo and DaSilva used gang members to distribute and store drugs, drug proceeds, and to carry out gang-related missions. For example, on Oct. 23, 2012, DaSilva directed gang member Patrick “Pistol” Gomes to obtain a firearm and go to Roxbury District Courthouse to assist a fellow gang member who was “trapped” by a rival gang member. Gomes asked DaSilva if he had a “greenlight” to shoot if necessary and DaSilva gave Gomes the go-ahead. Investigators had Gomes stopped in his rental car by the police outside of the Roxbury courthouse where officers seized a fully loaded Ruger P89 semiautomatic handgun from the glove box. On Feb. 4, 2015, Gomes pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and marijuana and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
The charging statutes provide a sentence of no less than 10 years and up to a lifetime in prison, a minimum of five years and up to a lifetime of supervised release, and a fine of $10 million on the charge of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances; no greater than 20 years in prison, a minimum of three years and up to a lifetime of supervised release, and a fine of $10 million on the charges of distribution of controlled substances; no greater than 10 years in prison, a minimum of three years and up to a lifetime of supervised release, and a fine of $250,000 on the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Pursuant to their respective plea agreements with the government, and pending acceptance by the district court at sentencing, Hidalgo has agreed to a sentence of 144-168 months in prison and DaSilva has agreed to a sentence of 120-168 months in prison. Both defendants also agreed to the forfeiture of cash, jewelry, and luxury vehicles.
Hidalgo, 34, and DaSilva, 31, both of Boston, each pleaded guilty before U.S. District Court Judge Rya W. Zobel to conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, cocaine, marijuana, and oxycodone, as well as firearm related charges. In January 2013, Hidalgo and DaSilva were two of 29 defendants charged with drug trafficking and firearm charges arising out of Operation Concord, a joint investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Boston Police Department, Massachusetts State Police, and Homeland Security Investigations that focused on gang violence and drug dealing in the Henry Street and Woodward Avenue areas of Boston. During the course of Operation Concord, law enforcement officials seized approximately $400,000 in cash, guns, jewelry, gold and silver bars, and several luxury vehicles.
From August 2011 through January 2013, Hidalgo and DaSilva, the respective heads of the Hendry Street and Woodward Avenue gangs, ran a lucrative drug trafficking business distributing crack cocaine, cocaine, marijuana, and oxycodone which was in turn distributed in Boston, Brockton, and Maine.
Hidalgo and DaSilva operated their drug business out of two primary locations: a house at 37 Hendry Street in Boston and a house known as “the Trap” at 36 Woodward Avenue in Boston. Customers seeking crack and marijuana would go to 37 Hendry Street to purchase drugs from gang members who stored the drugs and cooked cocaine into crack in the second floor apartment. In August 2012, 37 Hendry Street was shut down by the City of Boston as a result of numerous neighborhood complaints of drug and gang activity.
“The Trap” at 36 Woodward Avenue, which was run by DaSilva, operated as a round-the-clock distribution center for crack, oxycodone, cocaine and marijuana. When 37 Hendry Street was shut down, Hidalgo transferred his crack business to 36 Woodward Avenue.
Hidalgo and DaSilva used gang members to distribute and store drugs, drug proceeds, and to carry out gang-related missions. For example, on Oct. 23, 2012, DaSilva directed gang member Patrick “Pistol” Gomes to obtain a firearm and go to Roxbury District Courthouse to assist a fellow gang member who was “trapped” by a rival gang member. Gomes asked DaSilva if he had a “greenlight” to shoot if necessary and DaSilva gave Gomes the go-ahead. Investigators had Gomes stopped in his rental car by the police outside of the Roxbury courthouse where officers seized a fully loaded Ruger P89 semiautomatic handgun from the glove box. On Feb. 4, 2015, Gomes pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine base and marijuana and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
The charging statutes provide a sentence of no less than 10 years and up to a lifetime in prison, a minimum of five years and up to a lifetime of supervised release, and a fine of $10 million on the charge of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances; no greater than 20 years in prison, a minimum of three years and up to a lifetime of supervised release, and a fine of $10 million on the charges of distribution of controlled substances; no greater than 10 years in prison, a minimum of three years and up to a lifetime of supervised release, and a fine of $250,000 on the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. Pursuant to their respective plea agreements with the government, and pending acceptance by the district court at sentencing, Hidalgo has agreed to a sentence of 144-168 months in prison and DaSilva has agreed to a sentence of 120-168 months in prison. Both defendants also agreed to the forfeiture of cash, jewelry, and luxury vehicles.
Gang Member Sentenced to 10 Years in Prison for Heroin Trafficking #OperationWhiplash
A gang member was sentenced to 10 years in prison for heroin trafficking.
Jairo Fernandez, 27, was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Denise J. Casper to ten years in prison and four years of supervised release. In November 2014, Fernandez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin and distributing heroin. At that hearing, Fernandez admitted responsibility for over 100 grams of heroin.
The case was part of Operation Whiplash, an investigation of several street gangs in and around Lynn and Revere. Over the past two years, Operation Whiplash has resulted in federal and state charges against 47 leaders, members and associates of gangs, including Money Over Broken Bitches (MOBB), the Crips and Deuce Boyz in Lynn and the Bloods in Revere. As part of the investigation, law enforcement identified Fernandez as a member of the Deuce Boyz gang.
Jairo Fernandez, 27, was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Denise J. Casper to ten years in prison and four years of supervised release. In November 2014, Fernandez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute heroin and distributing heroin. At that hearing, Fernandez admitted responsibility for over 100 grams of heroin.
The case was part of Operation Whiplash, an investigation of several street gangs in and around Lynn and Revere. Over the past two years, Operation Whiplash has resulted in federal and state charges against 47 leaders, members and associates of gangs, including Money Over Broken Bitches (MOBB), the Crips and Deuce Boyz in Lynn and the Bloods in Revere. As part of the investigation, law enforcement identified Fernandez as a member of the Deuce Boyz gang.
Is the Mafia Still Alive Today?
In mid-1950s, the Italian-American criminal organization known as Cosa Nostra was enjoying the peak of its political influence and economic success. At the time, many questioned the organization’s presence. J. Edgar Hoover completely denied its existence for years. And unfortunately for the criminals describing themselves as “businessmen,” their reign atop the criminal underworld was swiftly coming to a close. Why did the power of Cosa Nostra begin to decline? Is this decline indicative of the death of the mob? And what does today’s mob look like?
The factors that led to this near cessation of overwhelming power are numerous, but two stand out as the most influential. The first is the death of omertà, the code of silence, and the resulting convictions. The second factor involved other criminal organizations pushing Cosa Nostra to the periphery as a result of competition. In spite of these factors, though, the mafia is still very much alive.
A Death in the Family
The downsizing of the mafia began in 1959 with the arrest of Joe Valachi
. Valachi was associated with the Genovese family of New York, which was prominent in Cosa Nostra. Offered a deal in which he could either testify about the mafia or face the death penalty, Valachi decided to talk. In an interview with the HPR, Jeffrey Robinson, author of The Merger: How Organized Crime is Taking Over the World, claimed that this was a pivotal point in the history of the Italian mob: “He broke omertà. That’s really a very important moment because until then nobody talked … the FBI realized that they could get inside Italian organized crime.” According to Robinson, FBI agents began approaching mob figures and offer protection from prosecution in exchange for information on other mobsters. It was an overwhelmingly successful approach.
This strategy leveled serious blows to the structure of Cosa Nostra, culminating in the Mafia Commission Trials of 1987 that indicted each head of New York’s Five Families. In 1992, even John Gotti, known as “Teflon Don” because charges never seemed to stick to him, was convicted on charges related to his organized crime activities. Omertà was dead for Cosa Nostra. According to Robinson, so many people flipped that the Sicilian mafia was able to enter the scene and take control of three of the Five Families of New York. They have maintained control to this day.
Ending an Illegal Monopoly
Cosa Nostra’s peaceful cooperation with other criminal organizations also contributed to the group’s decline. Traditionally, moving onto another group’s territory ensured a war. But according to Robinson, as Russian fraudsters relocated to Miami (Colombian territory)—followed by Italians interested in the heroin market—nobody was being killed. Law enforcement soon came to believe that this was because of collaboration between the organizations. When crack cocaine became readily available, many new criminal organizations got involved, and their quickly expanding influence muscled Cosa Nostra into the periphery. This loss of total power, coupled with the end of omertà, forced the Cosa Nostra into a largely successful effort to downsize.
Several criminal organizations, such as the Russian mob and the Mexican cartels, have filled Cosa Nostra’s power void in the United States.
New York University professor Mark Galeotti told the HPR that Russian operations in the United States consist mainly of fraud, including schemes that target the U.S. government. He explains, “There are millions upon millions [of dollars] being looted from Medicare and Medicaid [by Russian organized crime].” Similarly, law enforcement has largely failed in stopping the Mexican drug cartels. In an interview with the HPR, Ioan Grillo, author of El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency, argued that despite efforts by law enforcement to stop the cartels, “you still have a drug industry, you still have thousands and thousands of people working for organized crime, you still have millions of consumers of drugs, and you still have high levels of violence.” Grillo also acknowledged the success of other organizations in exporting their gangs to the United States, particularly Colombian gangs and Jamaican “posses.” These organizations may have supplanted the former power and influence of Cosa Nostra. However, despite their reduced influence, the Italians continue to operate.
Into the Modern Era
In the wake of September 11, the FBI’s focus on organized crime has decreased sharply in favor of counterterrorism operations. In a government document titled “10 Years After: The FBI After 9/11,” the FBI acknowledged that it shifted resources from criminal matters to counterterrorism. The document notes that the number of counterterrorist intelligence analysts has doubled. According to current New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton in a 2007 Policing article, “As law enforcement reacted to the aftermath of 9/11, and the United States’ federal dollars and priorities shifted, organized crime groups were able to exploit the reduction in law enforcement attention and moved aggressively to establish new ‘trade routes’ and alliances.” In a 2011 interview with CUNY TV, former New York Times reporter Selwyn Raab claimed that there were once 500 members of law enforcement working on organized crime in New York City. Now, he said, there are around 50, enabling the survival of Cosa Nostra.
According to Robinson, Italian-American organized crime has found a niche role in construction, extortion and protection rackets. In the construction industry, he explains, Cosa Nostra profits by winning bids to do contract work and then fraudulently collecting revenue for unnecessary or absent employees. According to a close friend of Robinson’s who is now in the witness protection program, five percent of all construction funds in the city of New York go to the mafia. Joseph Pistone, a former FBI agent who infiltrated Cosa Nostra in New York, told Quebec’s Charbonneau Commission, which was investigating construction bid corruption, that the mob controls the construction industry via unions. He said that the mafia bosses control unions and subsequently threaten to strike if the company doesn’t relinquish a “fee.” Robinson adds that the mafia still operates protection rackets, in which a business owner will be threatened and then asked to pay a fee for “protection” from this threat.
Despite its reduced influence, Italian-American organized crime is unquestionably alive. The death of omertà, combined with a crowded criminal market, resulted in a downsizing of Cosa Nostra’s criminal operations. It has transformed from a monopoly on the criminal underworld to another small player in a global network. Despite its diminished influence, it has successfully downsized its operations, paving the way for a sustainable, albeit smaller, operation. Cosa Nostra is not dead, and won’t be anytime soon.
Thanks to Jack Boyd.
The factors that led to this near cessation of overwhelming power are numerous, but two stand out as the most influential. The first is the death of omertà, the code of silence, and the resulting convictions. The second factor involved other criminal organizations pushing Cosa Nostra to the periphery as a result of competition. In spite of these factors, though, the mafia is still very much alive.
A Death in the Family
The downsizing of the mafia began in 1959 with the arrest of Joe Valachi
. Valachi was associated with the Genovese family of New York, which was prominent in Cosa Nostra. Offered a deal in which he could either testify about the mafia or face the death penalty, Valachi decided to talk. In an interview with the HPR, Jeffrey Robinson, author of The Merger: How Organized Crime is Taking Over the World, claimed that this was a pivotal point in the history of the Italian mob: “He broke omertà. That’s really a very important moment because until then nobody talked … the FBI realized that they could get inside Italian organized crime.” According to Robinson, FBI agents began approaching mob figures and offer protection from prosecution in exchange for information on other mobsters. It was an overwhelmingly successful approach.This strategy leveled serious blows to the structure of Cosa Nostra, culminating in the Mafia Commission Trials of 1987 that indicted each head of New York’s Five Families. In 1992, even John Gotti, known as “Teflon Don” because charges never seemed to stick to him, was convicted on charges related to his organized crime activities. Omertà was dead for Cosa Nostra. According to Robinson, so many people flipped that the Sicilian mafia was able to enter the scene and take control of three of the Five Families of New York. They have maintained control to this day.
Ending an Illegal Monopoly
Cosa Nostra’s peaceful cooperation with other criminal organizations also contributed to the group’s decline. Traditionally, moving onto another group’s territory ensured a war. But according to Robinson, as Russian fraudsters relocated to Miami (Colombian territory)—followed by Italians interested in the heroin market—nobody was being killed. Law enforcement soon came to believe that this was because of collaboration between the organizations. When crack cocaine became readily available, many new criminal organizations got involved, and their quickly expanding influence muscled Cosa Nostra into the periphery. This loss of total power, coupled with the end of omertà, forced the Cosa Nostra into a largely successful effort to downsize.
Several criminal organizations, such as the Russian mob and the Mexican cartels, have filled Cosa Nostra’s power void in the United States.
New York University professor Mark Galeotti told the HPR that Russian operations in the United States consist mainly of fraud, including schemes that target the U.S. government. He explains, “There are millions upon millions [of dollars] being looted from Medicare and Medicaid [by Russian organized crime].” Similarly, law enforcement has largely failed in stopping the Mexican drug cartels. In an interview with the HPR, Ioan Grillo, author of El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency, argued that despite efforts by law enforcement to stop the cartels, “you still have a drug industry, you still have thousands and thousands of people working for organized crime, you still have millions of consumers of drugs, and you still have high levels of violence.” Grillo also acknowledged the success of other organizations in exporting their gangs to the United States, particularly Colombian gangs and Jamaican “posses.” These organizations may have supplanted the former power and influence of Cosa Nostra. However, despite their reduced influence, the Italians continue to operate.Into the Modern Era
In the wake of September 11, the FBI’s focus on organized crime has decreased sharply in favor of counterterrorism operations. In a government document titled “10 Years After: The FBI After 9/11,” the FBI acknowledged that it shifted resources from criminal matters to counterterrorism. The document notes that the number of counterterrorist intelligence analysts has doubled. According to current New York City Police Commissioner William J. Bratton in a 2007 Policing article, “As law enforcement reacted to the aftermath of 9/11, and the United States’ federal dollars and priorities shifted, organized crime groups were able to exploit the reduction in law enforcement attention and moved aggressively to establish new ‘trade routes’ and alliances.” In a 2011 interview with CUNY TV, former New York Times reporter Selwyn Raab claimed that there were once 500 members of law enforcement working on organized crime in New York City. Now, he said, there are around 50, enabling the survival of Cosa Nostra.
According to Robinson, Italian-American organized crime has found a niche role in construction, extortion and protection rackets. In the construction industry, he explains, Cosa Nostra profits by winning bids to do contract work and then fraudulently collecting revenue for unnecessary or absent employees. According to a close friend of Robinson’s who is now in the witness protection program, five percent of all construction funds in the city of New York go to the mafia. Joseph Pistone, a former FBI agent who infiltrated Cosa Nostra in New York, told Quebec’s Charbonneau Commission, which was investigating construction bid corruption, that the mob controls the construction industry via unions. He said that the mafia bosses control unions and subsequently threaten to strike if the company doesn’t relinquish a “fee.” Robinson adds that the mafia still operates protection rackets, in which a business owner will be threatened and then asked to pay a fee for “protection” from this threat.
Despite its reduced influence, Italian-American organized crime is unquestionably alive. The death of omertà, combined with a crowded criminal market, resulted in a downsizing of Cosa Nostra’s criminal operations. It has transformed from a monopoly on the criminal underworld to another small player in a global network. Despite its diminished influence, it has successfully downsized its operations, paving the way for a sustainable, albeit smaller, operation. Cosa Nostra is not dead, and won’t be anytime soon.
Thanks to Jack Boyd.
Thursday, February 19, 2015
3 MS-13 Members Sentenced to Prison for a Gang-Related Murder and Shooting
Three MS-13 gang members were sentenced to federal prison for violent crimes that they committed on behalf of the gang, including the 2006 murder of a rival gang member and 2008 shooting of a teenage boy, announced Assistant Attorney General Leslie R. Caldwell of the Justice Department’s Criminal Division and Acting U.S. Attorney John A. Horn of the Northern District of Georgia.
Miguel Guevara, aka Blacky, 31, of Fort Walton Beach, Florida; Irvin Mejia Cruz, aka Triste, Lil Triste, 24, of Duluth, Georgia; and Walter Aldana, aka Goofy, 24, of Norcross, Georgia, were sentenced to 30 years in prison, nine years in prison, and 10 years in prison, respectively. U.S. District Judge Richard W. Story of the Northern District of Georgia imposed the sentences. The defendants each pleaded guilty in October 2013 to RICO conspiracy, and Guevara also pleaded guilty to using a firearm in relation to the commission of a crime of violence.
According to admissions made in connection with the defendants’ guilty pleas, the charges and other information presented in court, Mara Salvatrucha 13, or MS-13, is an international gang that originated in El Salvador and Honduras and spread to the United States. MS-13 members are organized into regional “cliques” within the larger gang. Each clique has a leader, often referred to as “the first word,” who conducts weekly meetings. At these meetings, members discuss their crimes and their plans to retaliate against rival gang members. The clique leaders collect dues from the gang members, which they use to buy guns and post bail for jailed gang members. Clique leaders often send money back to MS-13 leaders in their home countries, and report back to the same leaders about the clique’s activities on behalf of the gang.
MS-13 has operated in the greater Atlanta area since at least 2005. The gang staked out Gwinnett and DeKalb Counties as their home territory, where they committed murders, attempted murders and armed robberies, among other crimes.
According to admissions in connection with his guilty plea, Guevara was a member of MS-13, but in 2006, he decided to become less active in the gang and sought permission to “calm down” from the leader of his clique, Miguel Alvarado-Linares, aka Joker. Alvarado-Linares discussed this with other members at a meeting of the clique on Dec. 23, 2006, and the other gang members agreed that Guevara would have to shoot at a suspected rival gang member before he could become inactive. Guevara admitted that he and other gang members went to a nightclub in the early morning hours of Dec. 24, 2006 to hunt for rival gang members. Guevara admitted that he saw two rival gang members walk out of the night club and get into a car. Guevara and the other MS-13 members then followed the rival gang members. As the rival gang members exited the freeway, the MS-13 gang members pulled alongside, and Guevara fired multiple shots at the rival gang members. Guevara killed one of the gang members and wounded the other.
In connection with their guilty pleas, Cruz and Aldana admitted that they belonged to the same MS-13 clique. They further admitted that Mejia Cruz advised Aldana to shoot someone if he wanted to earn more respect within MS-13, and, on Aug. 21, 2008, Mejia Cruz gave Aldana a gun for the task. Aldana admitted that he left Mejia Cruz’s house with the gun, and encountered a group of teenagers, some of whom were playing basketball. Aldana challenged the teenagers, “Who do you claim,” asking to which gang they claimed allegiance. He then started firing into the crowd and struck a 14 year-old boy in the back. Aldana called out “Mara Salvatrucha” as he fled on foot. He later returned the firearm to Mejia Cruz.
Miguel Guevara, aka Blacky, 31, of Fort Walton Beach, Florida; Irvin Mejia Cruz, aka Triste, Lil Triste, 24, of Duluth, Georgia; and Walter Aldana, aka Goofy, 24, of Norcross, Georgia, were sentenced to 30 years in prison, nine years in prison, and 10 years in prison, respectively. U.S. District Judge Richard W. Story of the Northern District of Georgia imposed the sentences. The defendants each pleaded guilty in October 2013 to RICO conspiracy, and Guevara also pleaded guilty to using a firearm in relation to the commission of a crime of violence.
According to admissions made in connection with the defendants’ guilty pleas, the charges and other information presented in court, Mara Salvatrucha 13, or MS-13, is an international gang that originated in El Salvador and Honduras and spread to the United States. MS-13 members are organized into regional “cliques” within the larger gang. Each clique has a leader, often referred to as “the first word,” who conducts weekly meetings. At these meetings, members discuss their crimes and their plans to retaliate against rival gang members. The clique leaders collect dues from the gang members, which they use to buy guns and post bail for jailed gang members. Clique leaders often send money back to MS-13 leaders in their home countries, and report back to the same leaders about the clique’s activities on behalf of the gang.
MS-13 has operated in the greater Atlanta area since at least 2005. The gang staked out Gwinnett and DeKalb Counties as their home territory, where they committed murders, attempted murders and armed robberies, among other crimes.
According to admissions in connection with his guilty plea, Guevara was a member of MS-13, but in 2006, he decided to become less active in the gang and sought permission to “calm down” from the leader of his clique, Miguel Alvarado-Linares, aka Joker. Alvarado-Linares discussed this with other members at a meeting of the clique on Dec. 23, 2006, and the other gang members agreed that Guevara would have to shoot at a suspected rival gang member before he could become inactive. Guevara admitted that he and other gang members went to a nightclub in the early morning hours of Dec. 24, 2006 to hunt for rival gang members. Guevara admitted that he saw two rival gang members walk out of the night club and get into a car. Guevara and the other MS-13 members then followed the rival gang members. As the rival gang members exited the freeway, the MS-13 gang members pulled alongside, and Guevara fired multiple shots at the rival gang members. Guevara killed one of the gang members and wounded the other.
In connection with their guilty pleas, Cruz and Aldana admitted that they belonged to the same MS-13 clique. They further admitted that Mejia Cruz advised Aldana to shoot someone if he wanted to earn more respect within MS-13, and, on Aug. 21, 2008, Mejia Cruz gave Aldana a gun for the task. Aldana admitted that he left Mejia Cruz’s house with the gun, and encountered a group of teenagers, some of whom were playing basketball. Aldana challenged the teenagers, “Who do you claim,” asking to which gang they claimed allegiance. He then started firing into the crowd and struck a 14 year-old boy in the back. Aldana called out “Mara Salvatrucha” as he fled on foot. He later returned the firearm to Mejia Cruz.
Tuesday, February 17, 2015
Patronage, Cronyism, and Criminality is stuffed into Corrupt Illinois #WheresMine
Public funds spent on jets and horses. Shoeboxes stuffed with embezzled cash. Ghost payrolls and incarcerated ex-governors. Illinois' culture of "Where's mine?" and the public apathy it engenders has made our state and local politics a disgrace.
In Corrupt Illinois: Patronage, Cronyism, and Criminality, veteran political observers Thomas J. Gradel and Dick Simpson take aim at business-as-usual. Naming names
, the authors lead readers through a gallery of rogues and rotten apples to illustrate how generations of chicanery have undermined faith in, and hope for, honest government. From there, they lay out how to implement institutional reforms that provide accountability and eradicate the favoritism, sweetheart deals, and conflicts of interest corroding our civic life.
Corrupt Illinois lays out a blueprint to transform our politics from a pay-to-play–driven marketplace into what it should be: an instrument of public good.
"Corrupt Illinois is the most comprehensive account of corruption in our state ever published. It proposes cures, which will take decades to implement fully, but which deserve our attention now."--Governor Jim Edgar, from the foreword
"Gradel and Simpson have chronicled corruption in Illinois for decades. Here they sum up their findings in distressing, damning detail. The authors propose important steps to tamp down this corruption."--James A. Nowlan, former state representative and co-author of Fixing Illinois: Politics and Policy in the Prairie State
"Corrupt Illinois documents the vast scope and depth of corruption in Illinois politics, which is a monumental achievement in itself. Of equal importance, it explores the underlying roots of that corruption, building an understanding of its dynamics and the policy changes necessary to address it."--Kent Redfield, professor emeritus of political science, University of Illinois at Springfield
Thomas J. Gradel spent 35 years as a media consultant and served on the staff of Governor Dan Walker. He is a freelance writer and political researcher. Dick Simpson is a professor, former head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Chicago, former Chicago alderman and congressional candidate. His books include Rogues, Rebels, And Rubber Stamps: The Politics Of The Chicago City Council, 1863 To The Present (Urban Policy Challenges), and The Struggle for Power and Influence in Cities and States.
In Corrupt Illinois: Patronage, Cronyism, and Criminality, veteran political observers Thomas J. Gradel and Dick Simpson take aim at business-as-usual. Naming names
, the authors lead readers through a gallery of rogues and rotten apples to illustrate how generations of chicanery have undermined faith in, and hope for, honest government. From there, they lay out how to implement institutional reforms that provide accountability and eradicate the favoritism, sweetheart deals, and conflicts of interest corroding our civic life.Corrupt Illinois lays out a blueprint to transform our politics from a pay-to-play–driven marketplace into what it should be: an instrument of public good.
"Corrupt Illinois is the most comprehensive account of corruption in our state ever published. It proposes cures, which will take decades to implement fully, but which deserve our attention now."--Governor Jim Edgar, from the foreword
"Gradel and Simpson have chronicled corruption in Illinois for decades. Here they sum up their findings in distressing, damning detail. The authors propose important steps to tamp down this corruption."--James A. Nowlan, former state representative and co-author of Fixing Illinois: Politics and Policy in the Prairie State
"Corrupt Illinois documents the vast scope and depth of corruption in Illinois politics, which is a monumental achievement in itself. Of equal importance, it explores the underlying roots of that corruption, building an understanding of its dynamics and the policy changes necessary to address it."--Kent Redfield, professor emeritus of political science, University of Illinois at Springfield
Thomas J. Gradel spent 35 years as a media consultant and served on the staff of Governor Dan Walker. He is a freelance writer and political researcher. Dick Simpson is a professor, former head of the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Chicago, former Chicago alderman and congressional candidate. His books include Rogues, Rebels, And Rubber Stamps: The Politics Of The Chicago City Council, 1863 To The Present (Urban Policy Challenges), and The Struggle for Power and Influence in Cities and States.
Sunday, February 15, 2015
Fugitive for 6 years Arrested in Switzerland
Wander Junior Vargas Canela, aka Wallis Torres, an inmate who escaped the Massachusetts Department of Correction and fled to Switzerland, has been turned over to United States authorities following his arrest in Switzerland.
Special agents from the FBI’s Violent Crime Task Force escorted Canela from Switzerland to Logan International Airport. The FBI worked with the Massachusetts Department of Correction’s Fugitive Apprehension Unit (FAU) to locate Canela and bring him back to Massachusetts.
An arrest warrant had been issued for Canela, under his assumed identity of Wallis Torres, out of West Roxbury District Court on September 17, 2008, the day after he escaped from the Boston Pre-Release Correctional Center. He was serving a four- to seven-year sentence for possession of a Class B substance with intent to distribute.
Investigators developed information which indicated Canela had fled the United States and was traveling within Europe, specifically in the areas of Spain and Switzerland. They also learned that Canela was using an assumed name, Wallis Torres, while in Massachusetts.
On December 13, 2013, a federal arrest warrant was issued out of the United States District Court in Massachusetts for Canela on a charge of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution which holds a maximum imprisonment of five years.
FBI Boston and members of FAU developed several leads in Spain, the Dominican Republic, and Switzerland relative to the activities of Canela. With the assistance of the FBI’s legal attaché offices in these respective countries, it was determined that he was residing in Switzerland.
On April 15, 2014, Canela was arrested by the Canton Aargau Police (Switzerland) for possession of cocaine and was held in Swiss custody on a provisional arrest warrant generated by FBI Boston/FAU seeking extradition back to Massachusetts.
Upon arrival, Canela will return to the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Correction where he will serve the remainder of his outstanding sentence; four years and four months. He will also face additional charges relating to his escape and unlawful flight.
“This is a great example of multiple government agencies and nations working together to bring fugitives like Canela back to the United States to face justice,” said Vincent B. Lisi, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Boston Division. “I want to thank the government of Switzerland for its excellent cooperation, as well as the Massachusetts Department of Correction’s Fugitive Apprehension Unit, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Massachusetts State Police, the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office and the Essex County District Attorney’s Office.”
Massachusetts Department of Correction Commissioner Carol Higgins O’Brien added, “We extremely pleased with the law enforcement and interagency partnerships that allowed this fugitive to be returned to Massachusetts to serve out the remainder of his sentence.”
Canela, aka Torres, 29, had been a fugitive for six years.
Special agents from the FBI’s Violent Crime Task Force escorted Canela from Switzerland to Logan International Airport. The FBI worked with the Massachusetts Department of Correction’s Fugitive Apprehension Unit (FAU) to locate Canela and bring him back to Massachusetts.
An arrest warrant had been issued for Canela, under his assumed identity of Wallis Torres, out of West Roxbury District Court on September 17, 2008, the day after he escaped from the Boston Pre-Release Correctional Center. He was serving a four- to seven-year sentence for possession of a Class B substance with intent to distribute.
Investigators developed information which indicated Canela had fled the United States and was traveling within Europe, specifically in the areas of Spain and Switzerland. They also learned that Canela was using an assumed name, Wallis Torres, while in Massachusetts.
On December 13, 2013, a federal arrest warrant was issued out of the United States District Court in Massachusetts for Canela on a charge of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution which holds a maximum imprisonment of five years.
FBI Boston and members of FAU developed several leads in Spain, the Dominican Republic, and Switzerland relative to the activities of Canela. With the assistance of the FBI’s legal attaché offices in these respective countries, it was determined that he was residing in Switzerland.
On April 15, 2014, Canela was arrested by the Canton Aargau Police (Switzerland) for possession of cocaine and was held in Swiss custody on a provisional arrest warrant generated by FBI Boston/FAU seeking extradition back to Massachusetts.
Upon arrival, Canela will return to the custody of the Massachusetts Department of Correction where he will serve the remainder of his outstanding sentence; four years and four months. He will also face additional charges relating to his escape and unlawful flight.
“This is a great example of multiple government agencies and nations working together to bring fugitives like Canela back to the United States to face justice,” said Vincent B. Lisi, Special Agent in Charge of the FBI’s Boston Division. “I want to thank the government of Switzerland for its excellent cooperation, as well as the Massachusetts Department of Correction’s Fugitive Apprehension Unit, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the U.S. Department of Justice, the Massachusetts State Police, the Suffolk County District Attorney’s office and the Essex County District Attorney’s Office.”
Massachusetts Department of Correction Commissioner Carol Higgins O’Brien added, “We extremely pleased with the law enforcement and interagency partnerships that allowed this fugitive to be returned to Massachusetts to serve out the remainder of his sentence.”
Canela, aka Torres, 29, had been a fugitive for six years.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)