ANGELO PRISCO, a captain in the Genovese Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, was sentenced today to life in prison by United States District Judge NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD in Manhattan federal court. PRISCO was convicted on April 27, 2009, after a two-week jury trial, of murder, racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, robbery, extortion, firearms offenses, arson, stolen property offenses, loansharking, and operating an illegal gambling business. According to documents filed in this case, the evidence at trial, and statements made at today's sentencing proceeding:
PRISCO was "made," or inducted, as a member of the Genovese Organized Crime Family in the late 1970s, and was later promoted to the supervisory position of captain. In his capacity as a captain, PRISCO supervised, oversaw, and profited from the criminal activities of his own crew of Genovese Family Soldiers and associates, which operated in the New York City area and in New Jersey.
On June 2, 1992, PRISCO arranged the murder of his first cousin, ANGELO SANGIUOLO. PRISCO received the order to kill SANGIUOLO from VINCENT GIGANTE, a/k/a "The Chin," who was then the boss of the Genovese Organized Crime Family. GIGANTE ordered the murder because SANGIUOLO had been stealing from another Genovese Organized Crime Family soldier, ANTHONY PALUMBO. PRISCO assigned two of his own crew members, JOHN LETO, a/k/a "Johnny Balls," and PAUL GACCIONE, a/k/a "Doc," to carry out the murder. PRISCO then devised a plan to lure SANGIUOLO to PRISCO's Bronx, New York, social club. After SANGIUOLO arrived, PRISCO told him to get into a van with LETO and GACCIONE, on the pretense that LETO and GACCIONE would help SANGIUOLO with a problem SANGIUOLO was having with another person. Inside the van, LETO shot SANGIUOLO numerous times, killing him, then left his body in the back of the van in the parking lot of a Bronx McDonald's. PRISCO then picked up LETO at the McDonald's, and went with him to dispose of the murder weapon.
PRISCO also was convicted of conspiring to commit robberies with members of his crew. In 1991 and 1992 robberies, PRISCO oversaw various crew members who carjacked and robbed at gunpoint jewelry dealers transporting large quantities of gold and other jewelry they had purchased in the Dominican Republic. PRISCO received $20,000 in cash from one robbery and a bag of gold worth about $50,000 from another robbery. PRISCO then bragged at his Bronx social club about the armed robberies, passing around a relevant newspaper article.
From 2003 to 2005, PRISCO ordered, approved, and supervised multiple violent home invasion robberies targeting individuals believed to keep cash in their homes, during which numerous victims were tied up and beaten. PRISCO had to "green light" the robberies before they could occur, and received a portion of any money stolen. PRISCO also instructed his crew members to "play dumb" if they discovered they had robbed another person tied to organized crime.
PRISCO also was convicted of committing extortion and conspiracy to commit the extortion of a Manhattan construction company owner. PRISCO and his crew first extorted the victim's company in 1997, when PETER RIZZO, an associate under PRISCO at the time, assaulted and broke a glass coffee pot over the head of the victim's business partner. Members of PRISCO's crew then pressured the victim and his business partner to drop the charges against RIZZO stemming from this 1997 assault. Seven years later, various other members of PRISCO's crew -- acting on his orders and following his advice about how to collect the money -- returned to the same construction company and threatened to cut off the victim's finger and harm the victim's family. The victim paid PRISCO and his crew a total of $50,000. Since the 1990s, PRISCO has extorted various other individuals and businesses, including the owner of a diner in the Bronx; the owner of a night club in Manhattan; and an electrical contractor in Brooklyn.
United States Attorney PREET BHARARA stated, "This conviction and the life sentence imposed today on Angelo Prisco puts an end to his decades-long career as a leader of the Genovese Organized Crime Family -- one marked by violence and intimidation. Today's sentence, and the dismantling of the defendant's mafia crew, serves as a reminder that those who pledge themselves to a life of crime will pay a high price in the end."
Mr. BHARARA praised the work of the FBI; the New Jersey State Commission of Investigation; the Orange County, New York District Attorney's Office; the Westchester County, New York District Attorney's Office; the New York State Police; the New York City Office of the Chief Medical Examiner; the New York Police Department; the United States Bureau of Prisons; the Morris County, New Jersey Prosecutor's Office; and the Rockaway Township, New Jersey Police Department for their contributions.
This case is being prosecuted by the Office's Organized Crime Unit. Assistant United States Attorneys ELIE HONIG and LISA ZORNBERG are in charge of the prosecution.
Thanks to ATN
Saturday, August 22, 2009
Tuesday, August 18, 2009
Ban on Video Gambling Supported by The Chicago Crime Commission
The Chicago Crime Commission encouraged the DuPage County Board to ban video gambling machines in DuPage County. They warned that the long-term cost to society would far outweigh any short-term revenue gains if video gambling machines are installed. Law enforcement and other regulators would be left with a virtually uncontrollable situation.
"The decentralized nature of video gambling may soon turn Illinois into the 'Wild West' of gambling," said J.R. Davis, Chairman of the Chicago Crime Commission. "I would encourage DuPage County as well as municipalities and counties throughout the state to ban the video gambling machines before they are ever installed," he added.
"Video gambling has been called the crack cocaine of gaming for good reason. With the proliferation of video gambling, communities can expect to experience an increase in crime and a rise in other social ills connected with gambling expansion," he continued.
According to legislative analysis, about 66,000 video gambling machines may soon be scattered throughout communities in Illinois. While a law enforcement needs analysis is currently non-existent, Davis estimates Illinois will soon have to hire hundreds of new police and regulatory personnel to begin addressing the law enforcement requirement of this gambling expansion. "Unfortunately, I haven't heard anyone address this reality or speak to how these needs will be met," said Davis.
Davis also expressed concern that it would be difficult if not impossible to curb the influence of organized crime in this new, tough to regulate enterprise. "It is a fact that organized crime is known to gravitate towards gambling and other ancillary businesses," he continued.
Additionally, Davis said that the state's self exclusion program, which prohibits problem gamblers from entering casinos, would be left hobbled if video gambling proliferates in Illinois. "I have significant concern that entire families will be left penniless because Mom or Dad will be feeding their entire paycheck into the video poker machines," he concluded.
"The decentralized nature of video gambling may soon turn Illinois into the 'Wild West' of gambling," said J.R. Davis, Chairman of the Chicago Crime Commission. "I would encourage DuPage County as well as municipalities and counties throughout the state to ban the video gambling machines before they are ever installed," he added.
"Video gambling has been called the crack cocaine of gaming for good reason. With the proliferation of video gambling, communities can expect to experience an increase in crime and a rise in other social ills connected with gambling expansion," he continued.
According to legislative analysis, about 66,000 video gambling machines may soon be scattered throughout communities in Illinois. While a law enforcement needs analysis is currently non-existent, Davis estimates Illinois will soon have to hire hundreds of new police and regulatory personnel to begin addressing the law enforcement requirement of this gambling expansion. "Unfortunately, I haven't heard anyone address this reality or speak to how these needs will be met," said Davis.
Davis also expressed concern that it would be difficult if not impossible to curb the influence of organized crime in this new, tough to regulate enterprise. "It is a fact that organized crime is known to gravitate towards gambling and other ancillary businesses," he continued.
Additionally, Davis said that the state's self exclusion program, which prohibits problem gamblers from entering casinos, would be left hobbled if video gambling proliferates in Illinois. "I have significant concern that entire families will be left penniless because Mom or Dad will be feeding their entire paycheck into the video poker machines," he concluded.
Monday, August 17, 2009
Russian Organized Crime Gangs Linked to Cyber Attacks on Georgia
The cyberattacks against Georgia a year ago were conducted in close connection with Russian criminal gangs, and the attackers likely were tipped off about Russia's intent to invade the country, according to a new technical analysis, much of which remains secret.
The stunning conclusions come from the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, an independent nonprofit research institute that assesses the impact of cyber attacks. A 100-page technical analysis is only being made available to the U.S. government and some cybersecurity professionals, but the organization did release a nine-page summary early Monday.
The report in part confirms some of the suspicions of observers, who theorized that the distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDOS), which crippled many Georgian Web sites, had its roots in Russia.
The report was chiefly produced through investigations by the CTO of the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, John Bumgarner. It involved analyzing a raft of data collected as the attacks were going on and afterwards. The data included server logs from a variety of stakeholders, some of whom would not share information with each other, said Scott Borg, director and chief economist of the institute.
Russia launched a five-day military campaign in August 2008 that corresponded with Georgia's attempts to assert greater control over the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, which have strong ties to Russia. Bombers struck targets throughout the country, and at the same time Georgian media and government sites fell under DDOS attack.
That timing doesn't appear to be a coincidence. The attacks were executed with an efficiency that indicated pre-planning, and the cyberattacks also preceded the first news stories of Russia's military intervention, according to the report.
"Many of the cyber attacks were so close in time to the corresponding military operations that there had to be close cooperation between people in the Russian military and the civilian cyber attackers," the report said. "Many of the actions the attackers carried out, such as registering new domain names and putting up new Web sites, were accomplished so quickly that all of the steps had to be prepared earlier."
Borg said that the institute is confident that the Russian government didn't directly carry out the attacks. But it is clear that Russia appeared to be leveraging civilian nationalists who were ready to take cyber action, perhaps with some low-level encouragement.
"It appears that the military invasion was taking into account the help they were about to receive ... by the cyberattack," Borg said.
It is not clear, however, at what level the interaction between Russian government officials and those who executed the attacks occurred. But it does appear that the loose coordination will likely become part of Russia's standard operating procedure from now on, Borg said.
A total of 54 Web sites were attacked, most of which would have benefited the Russian military campaign by not functioning, Borg said. By shutting down media and government sites, it was harder for Georgia to communicate to the public what was going on. Financial transactions were disrupted, and the National Bank of Georgia had to cut off its Internet connection for 10 days, according to the report.
Social networking sites helped recruit volunteers who traded tips on online forums in Russian, with one English-language forum hosted in San Francisco, the report said. Computers servers that had been used in the past to host malicious software by Russian criminal gangs were also used in the attacks.
"It appears that Russian criminal organizations made no effort to conceal their involvement in the cyber campaign against Georgia because they wanted to claim credit for it," the report said.
DDOS attacks work by bombarding a Web site with too many page requests, which causes it to become unavailable due to bandwidth problems unless security measures are taken. The attack is executed by a botnet, or a network of PCs that become infected with malicious code controlled by a hacker.
The code used to command those machines to attack the Web sites appeared to be customized specifically for the Georgia campaign, the report said. Three of the software programs used were designed to test Web sites to see how much traffic they can handle.
A fourth program was originally designed to add functions to Web sites but was altered by the hackers to request nonexistent Web pages. That tool, which is HTTP-based, proved more efficient than the ICMP-based (Internet Control Message Protocol) attacks used against Estonia in 2007, the report said.
Further evidence showed that Georgia could have been hit much harder. Some of Georgia's critical infrastructure was accessible over the Internet. While the civilian cyber attackers had signs of considerable expertise, "if the Russian military had chosen to get directly involved, such attacks would have been well within their capabilities," the report said.
"The fact that physically destructive cyberattacks were not carried out against Georgian critical infrastructure industries suggests that someone on the Russian side was exercising considerable constraint," it said.
Thanks to Jeremy Kirk
The stunning conclusions come from the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, an independent nonprofit research institute that assesses the impact of cyber attacks. A 100-page technical analysis is only being made available to the U.S. government and some cybersecurity professionals, but the organization did release a nine-page summary early Monday.
The report in part confirms some of the suspicions of observers, who theorized that the distributed denial-of-service attacks (DDOS), which crippled many Georgian Web sites, had its roots in Russia.
The report was chiefly produced through investigations by the CTO of the U.S. Cyber Consequences Unit, John Bumgarner. It involved analyzing a raft of data collected as the attacks were going on and afterwards. The data included server logs from a variety of stakeholders, some of whom would not share information with each other, said Scott Borg, director and chief economist of the institute.
Russia launched a five-day military campaign in August 2008 that corresponded with Georgia's attempts to assert greater control over the South Ossetia and Abkhazia regions, which have strong ties to Russia. Bombers struck targets throughout the country, and at the same time Georgian media and government sites fell under DDOS attack.
That timing doesn't appear to be a coincidence. The attacks were executed with an efficiency that indicated pre-planning, and the cyberattacks also preceded the first news stories of Russia's military intervention, according to the report.
"Many of the cyber attacks were so close in time to the corresponding military operations that there had to be close cooperation between people in the Russian military and the civilian cyber attackers," the report said. "Many of the actions the attackers carried out, such as registering new domain names and putting up new Web sites, were accomplished so quickly that all of the steps had to be prepared earlier."
Borg said that the institute is confident that the Russian government didn't directly carry out the attacks. But it is clear that Russia appeared to be leveraging civilian nationalists who were ready to take cyber action, perhaps with some low-level encouragement.
"It appears that the military invasion was taking into account the help they were about to receive ... by the cyberattack," Borg said.
It is not clear, however, at what level the interaction between Russian government officials and those who executed the attacks occurred. But it does appear that the loose coordination will likely become part of Russia's standard operating procedure from now on, Borg said.
A total of 54 Web sites were attacked, most of which would have benefited the Russian military campaign by not functioning, Borg said. By shutting down media and government sites, it was harder for Georgia to communicate to the public what was going on. Financial transactions were disrupted, and the National Bank of Georgia had to cut off its Internet connection for 10 days, according to the report.
Social networking sites helped recruit volunteers who traded tips on online forums in Russian, with one English-language forum hosted in San Francisco, the report said. Computers servers that had been used in the past to host malicious software by Russian criminal gangs were also used in the attacks.
"It appears that Russian criminal organizations made no effort to conceal their involvement in the cyber campaign against Georgia because they wanted to claim credit for it," the report said.
DDOS attacks work by bombarding a Web site with too many page requests, which causes it to become unavailable due to bandwidth problems unless security measures are taken. The attack is executed by a botnet, or a network of PCs that become infected with malicious code controlled by a hacker.
The code used to command those machines to attack the Web sites appeared to be customized specifically for the Georgia campaign, the report said. Three of the software programs used were designed to test Web sites to see how much traffic they can handle.
A fourth program was originally designed to add functions to Web sites but was altered by the hackers to request nonexistent Web pages. That tool, which is HTTP-based, proved more efficient than the ICMP-based (Internet Control Message Protocol) attacks used against Estonia in 2007, the report said.
Further evidence showed that Georgia could have been hit much harder. Some of Georgia's critical infrastructure was accessible over the Internet. While the civilian cyber attackers had signs of considerable expertise, "if the Russian military had chosen to get directly involved, such attacks would have been well within their capabilities," the report said.
"The fact that physically destructive cyberattacks were not carried out against Georgian critical infrastructure industries suggests that someone on the Russian side was exercising considerable constraint," it said.
Thanks to Jeremy Kirk
Friday, August 14, 2009
Sopranos Movie in the Works?
'Sopranos"
producer David Chase remains coy about the possibility of a big-screen followup to the hit HBO show,but loose-lipped cast members are suggesting a script is already on the page.
It's been speculated that a major holdup to the big-screen version is a strong reluctance on the part of James Gandolfini to sign on to the project. But, according to a chatty Lorraine Bracco, that rumor is way off the mark.
"I don't think it's that at all," says Bracco about Gandolfini's supposed cold feet. "I think it's really trying to get the right script. Without the right script, it's really not worth doing."
Bracco isn't shy about making her concerns heard. "We've all talked to David to give him a kick in the booty to get it right," she says pointedly.
While HBO mouthpieces yesterday shot down any talk about the existence of a script, claiming it is "just rumor," Steve Van Zandt recently added to the buzz.
The "Sopranos" alum and Bruce Springsteen bandmate let slip to a Belfast newspaper that his character, Sil - who was struggling for his life in the show's abrupt ending - "is still alive."
Go figure. And Bracco doesn't sound like she's planning to stop at just one movie.
"I want us to be like 'Sex and the City' or 'The Bourne Identity,'" she gushed. "I want to make a million of them."
Thanks to Gatecrasher
producer David Chase remains coy about the possibility of a big-screen followup to the hit HBO show,but loose-lipped cast members are suggesting a script is already on the page.It's been speculated that a major holdup to the big-screen version is a strong reluctance on the part of James Gandolfini to sign on to the project. But, according to a chatty Lorraine Bracco, that rumor is way off the mark.
"I don't think it's that at all," says Bracco about Gandolfini's supposed cold feet. "I think it's really trying to get the right script. Without the right script, it's really not worth doing."
Bracco isn't shy about making her concerns heard. "We've all talked to David to give him a kick in the booty to get it right," she says pointedly.
While HBO mouthpieces yesterday shot down any talk about the existence of a script, claiming it is "just rumor," Steve Van Zandt recently added to the buzz.
The "Sopranos" alum and Bruce Springsteen bandmate let slip to a Belfast newspaper that his character, Sil - who was struggling for his life in the show's abrupt ending - "is still alive."
Go figure. And Bracco doesn't sound like she's planning to stop at just one movie.
"I want us to be like 'Sex and the City' or 'The Bourne Identity,'" she gushed. "I want to make a million of them."
Thanks to Gatecrasher
Thursday, August 13, 2009
FBI Agent Who Served on Joint FBI-Chicago Police Department Organized Crime Task Force Named SAC of Buffalo
James H. Robertson has been named special agent in charge (SAC) of the FBI’s Buffalo Division. FBI Director Robert S. Mueller, III appointed him to this position to replace SAC Laurie J. Bennett, who now serves as deputy assistant director of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate at FBI Headquarters Most recently, Mr. Robertson served as chief of the International Terrorism Operations Section II, FBI Counterterrorism Division.
Mr. Robertson entered on duty as an FBI special agent in May 1989. Upon completion of training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, he was assigned to the Chicago Division. While there, he served on a joint FBI-Chicago Police Department Organized Crime Task Force targeting the Chicago Outfit. He also served as a primary sniper for the regional SWAT team. In January 1998, he was promoted to supervisory special agent in the Inspection Division at FBI Headquarters, responsible for evaluating the FBI’s Confidential Informant Program.
In January 2000, Mr. Robertson was assigned to the Detroit Division as the supervisory senior resident agent of the Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo, and St. Joseph Resident Agencies. He served in that role until October 2004, when he was promoted to assistant special agent in charge (ASAC) of the Cincinnati Division’s National Security Branch. As ASAC, he had program management responsibilities for the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Field Intelligence, and Cyber Crimes Programs.
From October 2005 to April 2006, Mr. Robertson served as the Counterterrorism Division’s on-scene commander for the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO). He commanded all FBI operations in Iraq, and was responsible for liaison with Department of Defense elements and military commanders within the ITO.
Mr. Robertson was promoted to section chief of the Counterterrorism Division’s International Terrorism Operations Section II in November 2007. In that role, he formulated and implemented the Counterterrorism Division’s overseas strategy and was responsible for the day-to-day management and oversight of international terrorism investigations and operations abroad.
Mr. Robertson is married and has two daughters.
Mr. Robertson entered on duty as an FBI special agent in May 1989. Upon completion of training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia, he was assigned to the Chicago Division. While there, he served on a joint FBI-Chicago Police Department Organized Crime Task Force targeting the Chicago Outfit. He also served as a primary sniper for the regional SWAT team. In January 1998, he was promoted to supervisory special agent in the Inspection Division at FBI Headquarters, responsible for evaluating the FBI’s Confidential Informant Program.
In January 2000, Mr. Robertson was assigned to the Detroit Division as the supervisory senior resident agent of the Grand Rapids, Kalamazoo, and St. Joseph Resident Agencies. He served in that role until October 2004, when he was promoted to assistant special agent in charge (ASAC) of the Cincinnati Division’s National Security Branch. As ASAC, he had program management responsibilities for the Counterterrorism, Counterintelligence, Field Intelligence, and Cyber Crimes Programs.
From October 2005 to April 2006, Mr. Robertson served as the Counterterrorism Division’s on-scene commander for the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO). He commanded all FBI operations in Iraq, and was responsible for liaison with Department of Defense elements and military commanders within the ITO.
Mr. Robertson was promoted to section chief of the Counterterrorism Division’s International Terrorism Operations Section II in November 2007. In that role, he formulated and implemented the Counterterrorism Division’s overseas strategy and was responsible for the day-to-day management and oversight of international terrorism investigations and operations abroad.
Mr. Robertson is married and has two daughters.
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